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ABSTRACT 
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler (2003, 2006, 2009) contend that the government is 
justified in shaping certain choices of individuals to advance their well-being.  In this 
paper, I argue that those who are committed to a robust notion of autonomy, which I call 
autonomy as authority, have good reason to reject the Sunstein-Thaler (S/T) argument 
for libertarian paternalism.  I draw from Joseph Raz’s (1990) idea of exclusionary rea-
sons and Daniel Groll’s (2012) conception of autonomy to argue that the S/T argument 
for libertarian paternalism fails to respect autonomy.  I consider if soft paternalism 
could be called upon as a foundation for libertarian paternalism, but argue against this 
possibility.  I conclude that an adequate defense of libertarian paternalism would need 
to directly attack the notion of autonomy as authority, but such an attack has yet to be 
mounted by the defenders of libertarian paternalism.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Contemporary liberals who identify with Mill’s anti-paternalism in On Liberty tend 
to think that paternalism practiced by the state in relation to competent adults is unjus-
tifiable.  Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler (2003, 2006, 2009), however, contend that 
there is good reason to embrace some types of paternalism to promote the welfare of 
individuals.  In light of recent research revealing ubiquitous and seemingly unshakable 
cognitive biases in individual decision-making, Sunstein and Thaler contend that the 
government is justified in shaping certain choices of individuals to advance their well-
being.  Sunstein and Thaler think that their position, which they call “libertarian pater-
nalism,” is defensible even to those who value autonomy.  In this thesis, I argue that 
those who are committed to a robust notion of autonomy, which I call “autonomy as au-
thority,” have good reason to reject the Sunstein-Thaler (S/T) argument for libertarian 
paternalist policies, though their policy recommendations might still be defensible.   
There are many possible avenues for defending the S/T policy recommendations.  
One such route might be to utilize Joel Feinberg's concept of soft paternalism.  Accord-
ing to Feinberg, the soft paternalism position allows that it is morally permissible for the 
government to interfere with an individual's self-regarding action if that the action is 
substantially nonvoluntary (Feinberg, 1986, p. 12).  Building on Feinberg's position, one 
might argue that because cognitive biases compromise the voluntariness of certain ac-
tions, it is permissible for the government to interfere with individual self-regarding ac-
tions when these actions result from a cognitive bias.  However, as with the S/T argu-
ment for libertarian paternalism, I argue that those who value autonomy have good rea-
son to reject the soft paternalism argument for government institutional remedies for 
cognitive biases.  Like the S/T argument, the soft paternalist does not give autonomy 
the sort of respect it intuitively deserves.  Ultimately, I allow that while the libertarian 
2 
paternalism policy recommendations might still be defensible, an adequate defense of 
the policies would require a direct attack on autonomy as authority, and such an attack 
has yet to be mounted by the defenders of libertarian paternalism. 
The thesis will proceed as follows.  In Chapter Two, I will explain some of the cur-
rent debates surrounding the topic of government paternalism, specifically the dis-
course surrounding the definition of paternalism and the distinction between hard and 
soft paternalism, which will lay a foundation for the other chapters.  I will also survey 
some of the recent responses to libertarian paternalism.  In Chapter Three, I will pre-
sent the S/T argument for libertarian paternalism and present one worry about Sunstein 
and Thaler notion of well-being.  Chapter Four is devoted to my argument that the S/T 
treatment of autonomy counters the strong intuition that the autonomous person has 
authority over certain areas of her life.  What is problematic about the S/T argument is 
that it subordinates the individual’s will to considerations of her well-being.  Sunstein 
and Thaler provide no good reason to accept the view that considerations of well-being 
should be prior to considerations about autonomy, an argument they need to provide 
given the strong intuition of autonomy as authority.  In Chapter Five, I propose that lib-
ertarian paternalism might be defensible if construed as a version of Joel Feinberg’s 
notion of soft paternalism.  I consider an article by J.D. Trout (2005) as one example of 
this strategy.  Trout contends that since an individual's capacity to make choices is 
compromised by cognitive biases, it is acceptable for the government to institute reme-
dial policies to promote the welfare of those individuals.  I present an objection that lib-
ertarian paternalists would need to overcome to go this route.  In Chapter Five, I con-
clude that the most promising defense will involve challenging the notion that, in the 
case of competent adults, considerations about autonomy should always serve as a 
trump over considerations of well-being. 
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1.1 THE DEFINITION OF PATERNALISM  
Joel Feinberg (1986) captures one aspect of what makes paternalistic behavior 
intuitively inappropriate in the case of competent adults.  In his description of what he 
calls "presumptively benevolent paternalism," Feinberg broadly explains that paternal-
ism involves acting toward individuals in a certain way "'for their own good,' whatever 
their wishes in the matter" (1986, p. 5).  Paternalistic behavior ultimately amounts to 
"treating adults as if they were children … by forcing them to act or forbear in certain 
ways" (1986, p. 5) for their own welfare.  It is commonly agreed that paternalistic behav-
ior directed toward competent adults involves treating individuals in a degrading way 
that disregards their capacity for directing their own lives. 
However, though it is widely agreed that paternalistic behavior involves treating 
competent adults in a degrading manner, the exact characteristics of a behavior that 
qualify it as "paternalistic" is hotly contested among many moral and political philoso-
phers.  Standard definitions of paternalism tend to identify three necessary features 
that must be present for a particular behavior to be considered "paternalistic: 1) inter-
ference in the self-regarding actions of an individual, 2) coercion or a limitation of the 
individual's freedom, and 3) a motive to advance the individual's well-being or to avert 
harm of the individual.  Representing this standard definition, Gerald Dworkin (2010) 
argues that "[p]aternalism is the interference of a state or an individual with another 
person, against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the person inter-
fered with will be better off or protected from harm" (2010, p. 1; c.f. Feinberg, 1986,1   p. 
5; Archard, 1990, p. 36-42; Beauchamp, 2010, p. 103).  Richard Arneson (1980) utilizes 
a similar notion of paternalism in his own definition of paternalistic government policy, 
                                                     
1 Feinberg calls this sort of paternalism "presumptively blamable benevolent paternalism." 
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observing that a paternalistic policy is one that involves a restriction on liberty, is done 
exclusively out of consideration for the individual's good, and opposes the individual's 
present will or "prior commitment" (Arneson, 1980, p. 471).  While philosophers debate 
the details of the three main components of paternalism (e.g. the nature of coercion, the 
distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding action, the nature of legal mo-
tives, etc.), they typically assume that the three must be present in a particular behavior 
for it to qualify as paternalistic.        
Several challenges have recently been issued to the standard criteria that iden-
tify a behavior as paternalistic.  According to Seana Valentine Shiffrin (2000), the stan-
dard criteria offered for paternalism are overly narrow and fail to capture "the driving 
force behind our aversion to paternalism" (p. 212).  Shiffrin argues that a good defini-
tion of paternalism isolates precisely what it is about a particular behavior that strikes 
us as disrespectful or impermissible, and can be employed across diverse cases to ac-
count for normative reactions.  Using a series of hypothetical situations, Shiffrin con-
tends that a behavior need not involve direct interference with the self-regarding ac-
tions of an individual or coercion/limitation of freedom for the behavior to qualify as pa-
ternalistic.  Rather, she argues that the worrisome aspects of paternalism have to do 
with the "substitution of judgment" and "the circumvention of an agent's will" (p. 213).  
Shiffrin describes the characteristics of paternalism as behavior 
(a)  aimed to have (or avoid) an effect on an individual or her sphere of legiti-
mate agency 
 (b)  that involves the substitution of one person’s judgment or agency for the  
   individual’s 
(c)  directed at the individual’s own interest or matters that legitimately lie 
within the    individual’s control 
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(d)  undertaken on the grounds that compared to the individual’s judgment or 
agency with respect to those interests or other matters, the interferer re-
gards her judgment or agency to be (or likely to be), in some respect, su-
perior to the individual’s.                
(Shiffrin, 2000, p. 218)   
While Shiffrin's characterization of paternalism might seem unconventional, philoso-
phers like Daniel Groll (2012) and Daniel Scoccia (2012) agree with her that coercion is 
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for paternalism.   
My aim in this thesis is not to defend or critique a particular definition of paternal-
ism, though I do draw from Daniel Groll (2012) who explicitly identifies with Shiffrin's 
approach to paternalism, in my own efforts to better understand why we have good 
reason to think that libertarian paternalism is disrespectful to competent adults (2012, 
p. 712).  Like Shiffrin, I hold that what is most worrisome about a certain behavior identi-
fied as paternalistic is the "affirmative disvaluing of the agent" that is seen in the "disre-
spect for those core capacities or powers of the agents that underwrite and character-
ize his autonomous agency" (Shiffrin, 2012, p. 220).  While I do not explicitly critique 
Sunstein and Thaler's use of the term "paternalism,"2 I do argue that their defense of 
certain government behavior is disrespectful to autonomous agents, and should there-
fore be rejected.  
1.2 THE EMERGENCE OF NEW PATERNALISM  
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler first proposed their idea of libertarian pater-
nalism in a brief paper aimed at encouraging economists to "rethink their views on pa-
ternalism" in light of research in behavioral economics (2003, p. 175).  Sunstein and 
                                                     
2 Groll (2012) provides a brief critique of the S/T use of "paternalism" (p. 707, ft. note 33).  Daniel 
Hausman and Brynn Welch (2010) provide a more extensive critique, calling the S/T definition of 
paternalism "unsatisfactory" (2010, p. 126), and arguing that the S/T characterization of several 
supposed paternalistic behaviors is outright mistaken (2010, p. 127). 
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Thaler's initial paper led to two other papers (2003b, 2006), which they recently formed 
into a book (2008).  Recognizing that the terms "libertarian" and "paternalism" might 
immediately strike many as a contradiction in terms, Sunstein and Thaler contend that 
their version of paternalism manages to preserve individual autonomy while getting 
people to act in ways that promote their own well-being.  Though other thinkers have 
joined the discussion by proposing their own versions of paternalism in response to 
studies on cognitive biases (Camerer et al., 2003; Loewenstein and Haisley, 2008; Bent-
Porath, 2010), Sunstein and Thaler's libertarian paternalism remains one of the more 
well-developed theories in the movement, sparking literature that supports their theory 
and provides additional defense for its application in the private realm (Maloberti, forth-
coming) and literature that rejects libertarian paternalism on both theoretical (Hausman 
and Welch, 2010) and practical grounds (Rizzo, 2009).  
There are two primary approaches to responding to libertarian paternalism rep-
resented in current literature.  The first approach is to press Sunstein and Thaler on 
their support of paternalism in their theory.  This approach includes pushing Sunstein 
and Thaler on their definition of paternalism (Hausman and Welch, 2010; Groll, 2012), 
questioning whether paternalism is really inevitable in certain situations as Sunstein 
and Thaler contend it is (Mitchell, 2005), and arguing that libertarian paternalism fails to 
address the worries that plague other paternalistic theories, such as not providing a 
bright line for limiting the reach of the government interference in the lives of individu-
als (Rizzo and Whitman, 2009).   
A second approach to Sunstein and Thaler's libertarian paternalism is to ques-
tion whether their theory actually protects individual autonomy as they contend.  Greg-
ory Mitchell, for instance, argues that one problematic element with libertarian pater-
nalism is that in the face of evidence that individuals are quite biased in their choices 
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and behavior, Sunstein and Thaler's objective is to promote welfare and not to protect 
or promote liberty (2005, pp. 1260-69).  Given their objective, Mitchell questions their 
commitment to liberty.  He writes, "A libertarian approach to choice-framing paternal-
ism would direct the central planner to frame choices in ways that push irrational per-
sons in directions that maximize their liberty or help them retain the greatest degree of 
future freedom to contract" (2005, p. 1262).  According to Mitchell, libertarian paternal-
ism fails to achieve the "libertarian" part of the title because the preservation and pro-
motion of liberty is a secondary concern behind advancing well-being.  Likewise, Daniel 
Hausman and Brynn Welch (2010) argue that the sort of liberty that Sunstein and Thaler 
protect, i.e. having a range of choices, is much narrower than what most people have in 
mind when they contend that liberty is important, i.e. having control over one's own 
evaluations and deliberation (2010, p. 128).  My own response to libertarian paternalism 
is akin to these concerns about whether Sunstein and Thaler are as successful in pro-
tecting liberty in their theory as they contend.  I briefly consider a problem with their no-
tion of well-being, but the heart of my argument is concerned with whether libertarian 
paternalism affords autonomy the sort of respect most people intuitively think it de-
serves. 
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2 LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM, WELL-BEING, AND PREFERENCES 
In this chapter I present Sunstein and Thaler's basic argument and consider a 
difficulty with interpreting their notion of well-being.  Section I explains the S/T argu-
ment for libertarian paternalism, and Section II draws attention to a potential problem 
with Sunstein and Thaler's presentation of the relationship between preferences and 
well-being. 
2.1 THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 
According to Sunstein and Thaler, although it is commonly taken for granted that 
reason and reflection will lead the individual to make good decisions, empirical studies 
reveal a number of cognitive biases that undermine that assumption.  Such studies 
show, for example, that individuals tend to be unrealistically optimistic about the suc-
cess of their plans, prefer the status quo even if it is disadvantageous for them, and ex-
perience an aversion to loss that leads them to make decisions that go against their 
own interests (2009, pp. 31-35).  An individual’s choices are even influenced by the way 
the options are framed (2009, p. 36).  Sunstein and Thaler offer the example of retire-
ment savings behavior as one instance of cognitive biases thwarting well-being (2009, 
pp. 105-119).  Because individuals tend to stick with the default option when given a set 
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of options, if a default employee savings plan requires individuals to “opt-in” to partici-
pate in the plan, individuals tend to remain un-enrolled.  In contrast, if a workplace 
makes enrollment in the plan the default option and then requires employees to “opt-
out” if they do not want to participate, participation in the savings program is signifi-
cantly higher (2009 p. 112).  Also, individuals enrolled in the savings plan tend to save 
the default recommended amount even though this amount is often much too low, and 
individual aversion to loss leads many people not to increase the amount of their contri-
butions with their pay raises (2009, p. 115).  According to Sunstein and Thaler, cogni-
tive biases influence individual deliberation in key areas of people’s lives beyond simply 
money matters—including in decisions about eating, choosing a health plan, selecting a 
school, and entering a marriage contract.  In these areas, individuals tend to make de-
cisions that thwart their well-being, decisions they would not make if they had over-
come those biases (2006, p. 234).    
Moreover, Sunstein and Thaler contend that government action could, in certain 
kinds of cases, negate the bad effects of cognitive biases and increase the chances that 
people will make better choices.  They point out that the government often presents a 
number of options to individuals, for example, as when individuals are given a choice 
among several motorist insurance plans (2006, p. 244).  The government, though, typi-
cally presents these options randomly without any regard for the biases that affect indi-
vidual choice.  Under this random approach, individuals often do not select what is 
good for them.  Sunstein and Thaler reason that since the government must present 
choices in some way, the government might as well “nudge” individuals to make better 
selections by setting as the default option the choice that the government thinks is best 
for most individuals.  
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The government might also nudge individuals by means of what Sunstein and 
Thaler call “required active choices” or “mandated choice” (2006, p. 257; 2010, p. 88).  
In this type of nudge, no default is given and individuals are forced to decide from op-
tions that are presented equally.  For instance, in giving students the choice to provide 
their addresses for military recruitment purposes, the government might make students 
(or their parents) fill out a form indicating whether or not they wanted recruitment litera-
ture to be mailed to them. (2010, pp. 88-89).  The hope is that individuals will more care-
fully select an option that is best for them if they must choose from equally presented 
options.  Yet, Sunstein and Thaler contend that though the mandated choice method 
might be the best approach for “emotionally charged” issues like providing information 
to the government for its military recruitment efforts, the default method is typically bet-
ter because it is more effective at shaping the decisions of individuals toward choices 
that will promote their well-being (2010, p. 88; 2006, p. 258). 
Paternalism is commonly thought of as interference in the self-regarding actions 
of an individual against that individual’s will but purportedly justified by a consideration 
of her well-being (Dworkin, 2010; cf. Arneson, 1980).  Sunstein and Thaler depart from 
this standard definition and construe paternalism more broadly as intentional “attempts 
to influence the choices of the affected parties in a way that will make choosers better 
off” (2006, p. 234; cf 2003, p. 179).  As they explain, libertarian paternalism is “paternal-
istic” because the government is intentionally encouraging individuals to make better 
choices than they otherwise would make.  (2009, p. 5; 2006, p. 235).  Sunstein and 
Thaler understand paternalism as a continuum  (206, p. 252).  At one end of the contin-
uum is non-libertarian paternalism, which involves coercion in that it forecloses an indi-
vidual’s options by either removing particular options from a choice set or imposing a 
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high cost on the individual for making certain choices (2006, p. 253).3    At the other end 
of the continuum is libertarian paternalism.  Since libertarian paternalism merely in-
volves a structuring of options in the choice set without foreclosing any of the options 
or making any options excessively burdensome to choose, they hold that libertarian pa-
ternalism is non-coercive.       
Sunstein and Thaler contend that libertarian paternalism is consistent with the 
libertarian ideal of freedom because it is non-coercive.  They contend that libertarian 
paternalism is “libertarian” precisely because it is “liberty preserving” (2009, p. 5).  
They also agree with anti-paternalists that freedom of choice is important: “Libertarian 
paternalists care about freedom; they are skeptical about approaches that prevent 
people from going their own way” (2009, p. 199).  Insisting on libertarian paternalism’s 
freedom-preserving credentials, Sunstein and Thaler claim that “[s]ince no coercion is 
involved, we think that some types of paternalism should be acceptable to even the 
most ardent libertarian” (2006, p. 236).  In libertarian paternalism, if an individual does 
not want to go with the government’s default choice, she only has to “opt-out” by select-
ing one of the other choice options.  Most people will go with a default option because of 
the cognitive bias toward defaults.  However, an individual who wants a different option 
only has to put in a small amount of effort to select it.  Sunstein and Thaler compare lib-
ertarian paternalism to setting up a cafeteria.  The cafeteria director can arrange food 
options in a way that encourages the clientele to select healthy options without actually 
removing the unhealthy options.  Intentionally structuring the food choices to encour-
age certain selections is a paternalistic but non-coercive act because all options are 
still available to individuals (2009, pp. 1-4; 2006, pp. 235-6).    
                                                     
3 In the extreme form, the coercion associated with legal paternalism is primarily seen as pro-
hibitive legal pronouncements backed by criminal sanctions.  See Joel Feinberg (1986, p. 8). 
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Sunstein and Thaler consider libertarian paternalism to be non-coercive in an-
other way, namely, that it does not counter the will of individuals by going against their 
currently held preferences.  Paternalism is standardly understood to involve opposition 
to the will of an individual (Groll, 2012, p. 696, cf. Dworkin, 2010).  However, Sunstein 
and Thaler argue that since people often lack preferences, or at least well-formed pref-
erences, until the government presents a choice set, the policies of libertarian paternal-
ism to shape the choice set do not violate individual liberty (2006, pp. 235-6, 342).   
In order to function, even at the most minimal level, the government makes de-
fault rules that influence “preferences and behavior” (2006, p. 243).  Revisiting the cafe-
teria example, it is clear that the cafeteria director must decide how to arrange the 
food.  Yet, Sunstein and Thaler contend that the director cannot simply guess at what 
people would choose based on pre-existing preferences, because individual prefer-
ences will be shaped by how the food is presented (2006, p. 236).  In shaping how 
choices are presented to individuals, the government is actually the starting point of 
preference formation.  According to Sunstein and Thaler, if people can be significantly 
influenced by how choices are shaped, then “their true ‘preferences’ do not formally 
exist” prior to the presentation of choices (2006, p. 236).  However, if an individual does 
happen to have a strong preference for a particular option, she can simply “opt-out” of 
the default and select a different option.  
The ultimate aim of libertarian paternalism is to advance the well-being of indi-
viduals.  Sunstein and Thaler think that government policy is a good way to accomplish 
this.  In response to those who object to paternalism on the grounds that an individual 
herself is best equipped to make the optimal decisions for her own life, Sunstein and 
Thaler contend that this assumption is false: “people’s choices cannot be reasonably 
thought, in all domains, to be the best means of promoting their well-being” (2006, p. 
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238).  Individuals can mitigate some of the effects of biases through education or seek-
ing expert assistance, but these tools are infrequently used, leaving Sunstein and 
Thaler to argue that “delegation and learning are insufficient to ensure that people’s 
choices always promote their welfare or that they always choose better than third par-
ties would” (2006, p. 239).  It can even be counterproductive to merely provide people 
information about their choice options and let them freely choose what they want with-
out shaping the choices.  Factors such as fear of knowledge about risks might actually 
result in people avoiding deliberation about the risks of choices altogether (2006, p. 
251).  Because of biases, Sunstein and Thaler write, “it is hopelessly inadequate to say 
that when people lack relevant information the best response is to provide it” (2006, p. 
250).  For these reasons, they argue that libertarian paternalism is more likely to pro-
mote an individual’s well-being than merely giving the person options without first shap-
ing them; “[s]o long as people are not choosing perfectly, it is at least possible that 
some policy could make them better off by improving their decisions” (2006, p. 235).  
Specifically, the S/T argument advocates giving an individual a default option, which will 
influence her selection if she lacks a strong preference, but preserve her options if her 
preferences are firm. 
Sunstein and Thaler contend that “respect for autonomy is adequately accom-
modated by the libertarian aspect of libertarian paternalism,” namely that libertarian 
paternalism is non-coercive in that it does not block or heavily penalize any choice op-
tions (2012, p. 237, ft note 1).  However, for Sunstein and Thaler, the well-being of indi-
viduals is the government’s primary consideration in its deliberation process about how 
to act in the lives of competent adults.  In the S/T argument, autonomy is valuable de-
pending on the person and whether or not she likes to make decisions.  Sunstein and 
Thaler admit that “freedom of choice is sometimes an ingredient in welfare,” but they do 
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not think that this is the case for everyone (2006, p. 237, ft note 1).  While some people 
like to select a wine from a wine list or be in charge of their medical decisions, others 
find the process of selecting a wine “basically intolerable” and “would prefer their doc-
tors to choose [their medical procedures] for them” (2006, p. 260).  According to Sun-
stein and Thaler, if an individual finds making choices to be “a subjective good,” then 
the government has more reason to mandate a choice (2006, p. 260).  Yet, ultimately, 
the respect given to autonomy is couched in concern for the individual’s overall well-
being.  Autonomy, as considered by the S/T argument, is only one part of an all-things-
considered evaluation of an individual’s good. 
Sunstein and Thaler recognize that some people think autonomy should be 
treated as an end in itself.  As they note, “Some of the standard arguments against pa-
ternalism rest not on consequences but on autonomy - on a belief that people are enti-
tled to make their own choices even if they err” (2006, p. 237).  However, Sunstein and 
Thaler reject the idea that the will of individuals should ever be lexically prior to consid-
erations about well-being when individuals lack set preferences.  They write: “We do 
not disagree with the view that autonomy has claims of its own, but we believe that it 
would be fanatical in the settings that we discuss [i.e. in settings in which the govern-
ment serves as the starting point of the decision process], to treat autonomy, in the 
form of freedom of choice, as a kind of trump not to overridden on consequentialist 
grounds” (2006, p. 237, ft note 1).  
2.2 WELL-BEING AND PREFERENCES 
Before turning to address the role of autonomy in libertarian paternalism, which 
is the primary concern of this thesis, I think Sunstein and Thaler's understanding of 
well-being and its place in their theory deserves some attention.  It is difficult to deter-
mine exactly what Sunstein and Thaler mean by "well-being," and the elusiveness of this 
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concept presents another possible problematic element in the S/T defense.  Sunstein 
and Thaler defend libertarian paternalism as a means to promoting individual well-
being.  They contend that in shaping individual choices, libertarian paternalism aims "to 
avoid random, arbitrary, or harmful effects and to produce a situation that is likely to 
promote people's welfare, suitably defined" (2003, p. 175).   According to Sunstein and 
Thaler, well-being or welfare (they use these terms interchangeably throughout their 
work) is different than just the satisfaction of revealed preferences, i.e. what people 
seem to want according to their actual choices.  In reference to their goal to promote 
individual well-being, Sunstein and Thaler note that "we intend 'better off' to be meas-
ured as objectively as possible, and we clearly do not always equate revealed prefer-
ence with welfare" (2003, p. 175). This contention and the other claims of libertarian pa-
ternalism presume that (1) individuals do not choose in ways that perfectly promote 
their own well-being, and (2) a third party can sometimes do a better job than an indi-
vidual at promoting that individual's own well-being.   
There are two ways to understand the first premise.  One interpretation is that 
Sustein and Thaler simply mean that individuals do not choose perfectly in that indi-
viduals do a less-than-optimal job of connecting means to ends due to cognitive biases.  
For example, an individual might prefer to retire with a certain amount of money, but, 
although thinking that he is making investment choices that advance this goal, the indi-
vidual's choices actually thwart its achievement because of cognitive biases.  People 
tend to be more averse to losing money that they already have than to missing out on 
possible gains, a cognitive bias that results in people choosing to "play it safe" when 
their investments could be earning more money (Sunstein and Thaler, 2009, pp. 33-4, 
122-3).  Encumbered by this bias, the individual, though aiming to save a particular 
amount of money, will make decisions that ultimately hinder or even thwart his goal.  
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According to Sunstein and Thaler, in this situation a third party could make a better de-
cision than the individual because there is an objective standard of means-end thinking.  
If the goal is to accumulate a certain amount of savings, there are better and worse 
ways to achieve this goal.   
On this reading of libertarian paternalism, an individual's well-being is comprised 
of achieving those preferences that the individual would have were she to make perfect 
means-ends decisions.  This seems to suggest that while well-being is comprised of 
achieving one's over-arching preferences, like the preference to have a comfortable 
retirement, one's well-being can be thwarted by other preferences, like the preference 
to be conservative with one's money rather than taking risks.  While over-arching pref-
erences are subjective to each individual, there is an objectively better or worse means 
to achieving those preferences.  Moreover, because of weakness of will, a phenomenon 
that Sunstein and Thaler thinks plagues most individuals, people are tempted away 
from achieving their preferences.  For instance, we might make plans to exercise in the 
morning, but when the afternoon comes, we are often tempted away from achieving 
what we set out to do (2010, p. 41).  Sunstein and Thaler draw from behavioral econom-
ics to say that individuals tend to display behavior that is "dynamically inconsistent" in 
that people tend to ultimately pursue preferences that differ from their initial prefer-
ences (2010, p. 41).  Libertarian paternalism would be effective at promoting individual 
well-being because the government is able to design policy options that help individuals 
overcome their cognitive biases in order to achieve their ultimate end goals.  The gov-
ernment figures out what the majority of people want in terms of over-arching prefer-
ences and then helps them to achieve that goal (2006, p. 260).  On this reading, the 
government advances individual well-being through libertarian paternalism by helping 
people achieve what they initially prefer before they are hindered by a lack of time to 
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research their choices, cognitive biases that skew their understanding of what it takes 
to achieve their goals, and weakness of will that leaves many goals unaccomplished 
through a lack of motivation.  
However, the above interpretation does not seem to capture entirely what 
Suntein and Thaler have in mind when they say that individuals do not choose perfectly 
to promote their own well-being.  The first interpretation seems plausible in examples in 
which making choices that promote an individual's ultimate aim are tricky and compli-
cated, as is the case with investing money for the goal of having a comfortable retire-
ment.  Investing money is complicated, and it is easy to see how cognitive biases might 
lead one astray from accomplishing one's overarching preferences.  Yet, Sunstein and 
Thaler provide many examples in which it seems that the real issue that they are con-
cerned with is the ultimate aim of individuals.  While individuals are susceptible to cog-
nitive biases when selecting the means to achieving overarching preferences, the fun-
damental problem is that the overarching preferences thwart well-being.  Sunstein and 
Thaler's argument for libertarian paternalism also lends support for this second inter-
pretation of premise (1), namely that individuals do not choose well to advance their 
own well-being because individuals do not always accurately identify what overarching, 
or ultimate, preferences they ought to have in order to live well. The issue is not so 
much that individuals cannot figure out how to bring about an end that they want, 
though this is a problem too, but rather that people choose the wrong ends. 
On this second interpretation of premise (1), individuals are hindered by cogni-
tive biases from recognizing and acting on what is really in their own best interest.  For 
instance, in the cafeteria example Sunstein and Thaler think it is pretty clear that eating 
apples will contribute more to well-being than eating Twinkies (2006, p. 236).  Because 
of cognitive biases, though, people are hindered from recognizing that what is really in 
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their best interest is that they eat healthy meals.  Likewise, in the example of automatic 
enrollment in retirement plans, Sunstein and Thaler think that being part of a retirement 
plan is a good action that promotes well-being (2006, p. 241).  They argue that if people 
were perfect at reasoning and not hindered by a lack of knowledge, they would see that 
having a certain amount of money set aside for a retirement is an objectively good 
thing.  On this account, individuals do not recognize what is really good for them be-
cause they are hindered by biases, lack self-control, and have a limited amount of time.  
It is permissible for institutions like the government to encourage people through 
choice architecture to save money for retirement, invest wisely, eat well, and get exer-
cise because these are all components of individual well-being that people would really 
seek after if they could reason perfectly.  In libertarian paternalism, there seems to be 
specific notion of well-being that can be known and promoted by the government.  
 A problem arises in Sunstein and Thaler's use of well-being in their argument in 
that while they want to limit their commitment to the first interpretation of premise (1), 
their argument also relies on the second interpretation of the premise, which has unfa-
vorable implications. On the second interpretation of premise (1), Sunstein and Thaler 
are critiquing people's ends rather than just critiquing the means that people typically 
select in attempting to achieve their preferred ends. This second interpretation of 
premise (1) is importantly different from the first interpretation, but I think it is present 
in Sunstein and Thaler's argument for libertarian paternalism.  According to the first in-
terpretation, the government is merely helping individuals to get what they really want.  
On the second account, the government is identifying what individuals should want be-
cause individuals are unable to do this for themselves.   
So, on the one hand, Sunstein and Thaler want the concept of well-being to con-
nect with preferences that individuals currently have because they are motivated to 
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make the libertarian paternalism's government policies as minimally intrusive in the 
lives of individuals as possible.  Libertarian paternalism is liberty preserving in that it 
does not counter any of the deeply held preferences of individuals.  They do not want to 
be seen as promoting "officious meddling" with individual preferences (2006, p. 241).  
Individuals are not that good at making choices to promote their own well-being.  Under 
the first interpretation of premise (1), the government is merely helping individuals get 
what they already want, which strikes many as permissible government action (c.f. 
Feinberg, 1986, p. 19; Arneson, 1980, pp. 471-72).  However, on the other hand, the S/T 
argument for libertarian paternalism also seems to rely on the idea that there are opti-
mal ends that individuals would want if they could think more clearly about the issues.  
These ends are objectively good, though Sunstein and Thaler say nothing about what 
makes the ends objectively good or how the government can identify these ends while 
particular individuals cannot.  In conflating the two views of well-being, Sunstein and 
Thaler gloss over many issues that might pose significant problems for their theory, and 
that might reveal their theory to permit more intrusive government action that would re-
quire a more robust argument for its defense.  
3 LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM AND THE AUTONOMOUS PERSON 
In this chapter, Section I draws from Daniel Groll’s recent argument that pater-
nalism can violate autonomy even if it is non-coercive.  I argue that the treatment of 
competent adults licensed by S/T’s libertarian paternalism is intuitively unacceptable.  
Section II draws from Joseph Raz’s idea of exclusionary reasons and Groll’s conception 
of autonomy to argue that the S/T argument for libertarian paternalism fails to respect 
autonomy. 
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3.1 PATERNALISM, COERCION, AND THE WILL 
Readers of Sunstein and Thaler’s works might find themselves agreeing with the 
policy recommendations of libertarian paternalism.  Helping people make better 
choices in order to live better lives seems like a good idea.  Libertarian paternalism ap-
pears especially attractive when the stakes are high.  If an individual’s life could be 
made significantly better through the government’s non-coercive nudges, libertarian 
paternalism seems to be a good solution to promoting the well-being of individuals while 
also preserving individual autonomy.  However, I think there is good reason to question 
whether the S/T argument for libertarian paternalism is actually consistent with a com-
mitment to autonomy, as they contend it is.  I grant, for the sake of argument, that liber-
tarian paternalism is indeed non-coercive, but I show that even non-coercive paternal-
ism is intuitively problematic. 
Daniel Groll (2012) has recently argued against the idea that the distinguishing 
mark of impermissible paternalism is coercion.  According to Groll, impermissible pa-
ternalism is commonly thought of as involving an act against the will of an individual 
(2012, p. 696).4  However, he thinks that it is quite intuitive that paternalism can be 
problematic even when the individual being acted upon lacks a preference, or a deter-
minate will, about a certain choice or action.  Groll provides the example of Ernest, a 
competent adult who is in debt (2012, p. 698).  Ernest has a good friend Sabina who 
could help him, but he has never even thought to seek her help with his money prob-
lems.  Without consulting Ernest, Sabina has been paying down his debt without giving 
any thought as to what Ernest would want her to do.  Her primary motive is to do what is 
best for Ernest.  Groll holds that Sabina is not acting contrary to Ernest’s will.  Since 
                                                     
4 While the term ‘will’ plays a central role in Groll’s paper, he never explicitly defines it. At one 
point he indicates that he means by will the general power of autonomous choice (2010, p. 694).  
At other points, Groll seems to use the term to describe intentionally held preferences.  In this 
sense, an individual has a will in regard to certain actions or outcomes. I use the term ‘will’ to 
refer to the power of autonomous choice, which is manifested by making determinate choices. 
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Ernest has never considered Sabina’s help as an option,  “he has no will with respect to 
the issue” (2012, p. 698).  Yet, Groll contends that Sabina’s paternalistic treatment of 
Ernest is intuitively problematic; the more secretive she is about her actions, the more 
intuitively troubling her behavior is.  Even if her actions do not counter Ernest’s will, Sa-
bina’s actions appear to be impermissible because, though Ernest is a competent adult 
and this matter is entirely of his concern only, she bypasses Ernest’s will to act out of 
concern for his well-being.  Ernest’s debt is his (and the creditor’s) business alone, 
unless he chooses to make it someone else’s business.  When Sabina is deliberating 
about how to act to promote Ernest’s well-being in this matter, her primary considera-
tion should be Ernest’s will.        
Sunstein and Thaler might respond that Sabina’s behavior is relevantly different 
from libertarian paternalism.  Unlike Ernest, subjects of libertarian paternalism do not 
have a choice made for them.  What is significant about the Ernest and Sabina case is 
that Sabina acts without giving Ernest any options.  In libertarian paternalism’s frame-
work, the individual is the ultimate authority with regard to the actions of others under-
taken for her own well-being.  Rather than the government bypassing the choices of in-
dividual, as Sabina does with respect to Ernest, the government gives individuals a 
range of choices and merely arranges the options, ultimately allowing the individual to 
freely choose what she wants.  Even if the government’s paternalism is secretive in that 
individuals are not informed that the government is actively shaping the options it gives 
to individuals, an individual can still make any choice she wants from the choice set.  
For this reason, Sunstein and Thaler might contend, libertarian paternalism is not prob-
lematic like Sabina’s actions.   
In response to this possible reply by Sunstein and Thaler, I argue that libertarian 
paternalism is still problematic, even though the government gives individuals choices.  
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Imagine two roommates: Casey and Merritt.  Casey tends to “mindlessly” eat when she 
is writing papers for school, gravitating to the most readily available food in the kitchen.  
Merritt, who does all the grocery shopping with Casey’s consent, notices that Casey is 
not making optimal food choices and that Casey complains about how she feels when 
she eats too many chips and sweets.  Without consulting Casey, Merritt secretly rear-
ranges the kitchen cupboards so that healthier food is toward the front of all the draw-
ers, with the intention that Casey will make better food selections.  She is motivated 
only by concern for Casey’s well-being.  Merritt is not closing off any of Casey’s options.  
He continues to buy sweets and chips.  He is merely nudging Casey to make better 
choices for her own well-being. 
By Sunstein and Thaler’s standards of acceptable paternalism, Merritt’s behav-
ior is entirely permissible.  Merritt is not blocking any of Casey’s options.  Moreover, 
since Merritt does the grocery shopping, essentially serving as the starting point for all 
Casey’s food preferences, Merritt’s paternalistic actions do not counter any of Casey’s 
deeply held preferences.  As Sunstein and Thaler understand coercion, Merritt’s pater-
nalistic actions are non-coercive.  Yet, Merritt’s attitude and actions toward Casey, a 
competent adult, are intuitively unsettling.  The more secretive he is about his actions, 
the more unsettling his behavior becomes.  We can imagine that were Casey to find out 
that Merritt has been secretively trying to influence her eating habits, Casey, a compe-
tent adult, would be justifiably irritated or even angry about Merritt’s attitude toward 
her and the paternalistic treatment.  It would seem that, though Merritt acts non-
coercively, by manipulating Casey’s own reasoning biases to influence her actions, 
Merritt intends to circumvent Casey’s ability to deliberate and decide for herself.  Even 
if she typically makes her eating choices mindlessly, she is a competent adult who is 
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capable of making decisions about her own well-being.  By trying to sidestep Casey’s 
will, Merritt fails to give Casey’s will the respect it intuitively deserves.  
The above hypothetical cases show that in certain areas of an individual’s life, 
competent adults command a certain authority, or dominion of choice.  In certain cases, 
respecting the will of an autonomous individual entails treating her will as the decisive 
consideration when one deliberates about how to act toward that individual.  This is the 
case whether the individual being acted upon has no choice in the matter, as in Ernest’s 
case, or whether the individual has options, as in Casey’s situation.  The significant fea-
ture that makes paternalism intuitively problematic is how the paternalist actor reasons 
about how to treat a competent individual.  What this means for libertarian paternalism 
is that, even if the government necessarily presents the choice options and does not 
block the individual’s choice among those options or coerce the individual in any way, 
there are features of the policies recommended by such paternalism that should remain 
worrisome to those who are committed to autonomy.  
3.2 AUTONOMY, RESPECT, AND EXCLUSIONARY REASONS  
In this section, I draw on Daniel Groll and Joseph Raz to give one possible ac-
count of the intuition that, in certain matters, the will of competent adults should not be 
subordinated to concerns about their well-being.  I argue that, for those who hold to 
what I call the conception of  “autonomy as authority,” libertarian paternalism does not 
give the autonomy of individuals the sort of respect we think it deserves.  
Daniel Groll (2012) argues that what is so problematic about Sabina’s treatment 
of Ernest is that she does not treat Ernest’s will as decisive, or as having dominion, 
when considering her actions directed at Ernest’s well-being.  Drawing from Joseph 
Raz’s idea that some practical reasons carry the force of excluding other reasons from 
consideration, Groll argues that in deliberations about cases in which a competent 
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adult has the authority as the decision maker, the competent adult’s will should exclude 
other considerations in the deliberation process.5   In decisions that pertain to a compe-
tent individual’s own well-being, which is an area of concern over which that individual 
has authority, the individual’s will should play a structurally decisive role in the delib-
erations of another party.  By “structurally decisive,” Groll means that the will of a com-
petent person “is meant to supplant the reason-giving force of other considerations not 
because it outweighs those considerations but because it is meant to silence, or ex-
clude, those other considerations from the practical deliberations of the subject of the 
demand” (2012, p. 701).  Groll recognizes that competent individuals, who by definition 
have a capacity for sound judgment, possess the capacity to make good decisions for 
themselves. Yet, he contends that the will has normative authority apart from whether 
an individual makes the best decisions for herself.  In those situations where the indi-
vidual has the right to be the decision-maker, the individual’s status as an autonomous 
agent is what grounds the authority of her will and its exclusionary force with respect to 
what can be done to or for her.  
To illustrate his account, Groll gives the case of Bob, a competent adult who 
needs surgery for his own well-being.  Since Bob is a competent adult, his will is au-
thoritative, or has dominion, meaning that in the matter of deciding whether to undergo 
surgery, Bob, and Bob alone, is “the de jure ultimate decision maker” (2012, p. 701).  
Bob’s capacity for autonomy grounds authoritative demands in the area of decision 
making that pertains to Bob’s health.  In her deliberations about how to act regarding 
the surgery, the doctor’s primary consideration should be Bob’s will not his well-being: 
“The point of an authoritative demand in this context is to render such appeals to what 
                                                     
5 Raz describes an exclusionary reason as a “second-order reason to refrain from acting for 
some reason,” with second-order reasons being any reason for an individual “to act for a reason 
or to refrain from acting for a reason” (Raz, 1999, p. 39).  So, if the will of an individual serves as 
an exclusionary reason in a certain case, it is a reason that excludes first-order reasons for an 
action, such as considerations about that individual’s overall well-being.  
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is good for Bob, at least on the part of the doctor, irrelevant” (2012, p. 701-2).  Groll 
imagines the doctor not doing the surgery at Bob’s request, but only because accom-
modating Bob’s request is important for Bob’s overall well-being, saying something like 
“‘I have decided that you should not have the surgery, because you do not want it’” 
(2012, p. 707).  Were the doctor to reason this way, Groll thinks Bob would be rightfully 
upset.  Getting the surgery is Bob’s decision to make.  The doctor would respect Bob’s 
capabilities as an autonomous agent only by making Bob’s will, and not his well-being, 
the decisive reason dictating how to act toward and for Bob. 
In contrast to Bob, Groll offers the case of Carl, an incompetent person who 
needs the same surgery as Bob.6  Unlike Bob, Carl lacks a capacity for deliberation and 
so his will is unable to ground authoritative demands.  For this reason, it is not disre-
spectful to Carl’s will to treat it as only “substantially decisive,” i.e., as one part of an all-
things-considered evaluation of Carl’s good.  As Groll explains, “There can be no in-
principle conflict between Carl’s good and Carl’s will, since Carl’s will cannot ground 
practical reasons that have any normative force apart from considerations of his own 
good” (2012, p. 706).  Groll argues that in considerations about Carl, Carl’s will is just 
one factor among many that go into the process of deliberation.  If Carl is adamantly 
against the surgery, the doctor might forgo the surgery because Carl’s preference is, in 
this instance, the constituent of his well-being that provides the strongest practical rea-
son. If Carl is less adamantly against the surgery, other factors may outweigh consid-
erations about his will.   
                                                     
6 Groll does not offer a bright distinction between competent and incompetent persons.  A com-
petent individual is someone who has the “cognitive powers” to make decisions for himself.  He 
imagines Carl as someone who lacks the cognitive powers for his will to be authoritative, but 
who has “enough of a picture of how [his] life should go to have autonomy be a constituent part 
of [his] well-being” (2012, p. 704). 
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Groll emphasizes that the primary feature that makes paternalism impermissible 
with respect to competent adults is the practical reasoning of the paternalist actor 
(2012, p. 717).7  In particular, one of the reasons that the paternalist actor does not 
treat the will of a competent subject as structurally decisive in her considerations is 
that she thinks that the subject “fails to exercise [his] capacity for sound judgment” (p. 
718).  The reasoning that underlies the actions of Bob’s doctor and Ernest’s friend Sa-
bina is that they think Bob and Ernest are failing to make a good self-regarding deci-
sion, or at least not as good a decision as Bob’s doctor and Ernest’s friend could make 
for them (2012, p. 718).  Yet, whether Bob or Ernest make the optimal decision in self-
regarding matters is their own business.  Respecting the will of a competent adult 
means recognizing that the individual’s self-regarding decisions are hers, and hers 
alone, to make.  Respecting the will involves making it the decisive consideration when 
deciding how to act toward that individual in matters regarding her well-being.   
While Groll (2012) does not explicitly discuss the S/T argument, his distinction 
between treating the will as structurally decisive and treating it as substantially deci-
sive is useful for understanding why libertarian paternalism disrespects the will of indi-
viduals, even though it preserves choices and does not counter the preferences of indi-
viduals (2012, p. 692).  If the government adopted the S/T argument for libertarian pa-
ternalism as a basis for policymaking, it would fail to accord the will of competent adults 
the respect it intuitively deserves.  
Sunstein and Thaler think that the will of competent adults should only be treated 
as substantially decisive in the government’s policy deliberations.  In the government’s 
                                                     
7 Similar to Groll, Seana Valentine Shiffrin contends that the defining feature of impermissible 
paternalism is the motive of an agent to supplant her own judgment for that of another compe-
tent individual in a matter that lies within the control of that individual (2000, p. 218).  Shiffrin 
writes that “[t]he essential motive behind a paternalist act evinces a failure to respect either the 
capacity of the agent to judge, the capacity of the agent to act, or the propriety of the agent’s 
exerting control over a sphere that is legitimately her domain” (p. 220).   
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deliberation process, they make considerations of well-being to be of higher priority 
than considerations about the will; “The promotion of well-being should be a principal 
goal” of the government (2006, p. 253).  This prioritization of considerations is espe-
cially apparent in Sunstein and Thaler’s reasons for preferring the default method of 
nudging over the mandated choice method.  Recall that in the mandated choice 
method, an individual’s options are presented in a way that encourages her to deliber-
ate about what choice is really the best for her, hopefully engaging her ability for care-
ful judgment.  In contrast, the default method is aimed at utilizing reasoning biases to 
increase the likelihood of an individual making a specific decision.  Sunstein and Thaler 
favor the default method precisely because it is more likely to result in the individual se-
lecting the optimal option.  They write that if a certain option likely “promotes people’s 
welfare, perhaps [the default method] should be preferred over requiring active 
choices” (2006, p. 258).  However, while mandated choices are intended to engage an 
individual’s abilities for deliberation and judgment, the default method attempts to skirt 
these abilities to achieve a specific outcome, i.e. the individual’s well-being.  Rather 
than supporting a method intended to encourage individuals to deliberate about their 
options, Sunstein and Thaler prefer a method intended to manipulate reasoning biases 
in order to promote well-being.  
Related to this last point, the S/T argument treats the will as only substantially 
decisive by treating the value of the will as entirely dependent on its role in well-being.  
Again, Sunstein and Thaler think that the mandated choice method is preferable if 
“making choices is itself a subjective good” (2006, p. 260).  For the most part, though, 
they think that individuals typically find “required choices to be a nuisance or worse,” 
which Sunstein and Thaler think is good enough reason to offer a default option instead 
of a mandated choice (2009, p. 89).  In support of this position, the S/T argument offers 
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the case of selecting a wine in a restaurant.  Some people like to choose their own wine 
while others prefer to have someone choose for them.  Sunstein and Thaler argue that 
this shows that, just by forcing individuals to make their own decisions, mandated op-
tions might actually hinder the well-being of those who find selecting an option unpleas-
ant.  They explain, “If we ask the waiter to select a good bottle of wine to go with our 
dinner, we will not be happy if he says that we should just choose for ourselves” (2009, 
p. 246).  Because forcing people to make a decision can hinder their well-being, Sun-
stein and Thaler think that there is good reason to prefer the default method over man-
dated choice in government policy.  
However, selecting a wine in a restaurant is importantly different from the gov-
ernment policy defended by libertarian paternalism.  In the wine scenario imagined in 
the S/T argument, an individual makes the choice to request the waiter to recommend a 
wine.  The individual is presented with the option of referring to the wine list, but de-
cides that she would prefer to defer to the recommendation of the waiter.  In other 
words, the restaurant gives the individual the choice as to whether she would like to 
forego choosing for herself.  In contrast, in the S/T argument for libertarian paternalism, 
when an individual is presented with a default option she is not first given the choice as 
to whether she would like to defer to the government’s recommendation.  One can 
imagine a scenario in which the government gives an individual a mandated choice as 
to whether she would like to be offered a default option that the government thinks 
would be the optimal choice.  But this scenario is importantly different from the default 
method defended by the S/T argument.  Sunstein and Thaler support the default method 
because it is the most effective method for promoting well-being; individuals do not like 
to make choices about many matters and the default method minimizes the chances 
that individuals will make a sub-optimal choice.  To achieve this result, though, the de-
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fault method attempts to bypass the individual engaging in the deliberation process.  
Sunstein and Thaler’s primary consideration is not the will of individuals, but their well-
being.   Yet, it seems that the existence of individuals as autonomous beings capable of 
deliberation and judgment, whether or not they decide to exercise this capacity, pro-
vides a strong practical reason for the government to make considerations about 
autonomy the primary principle in making of policy. 
Sunstein and Thaler might respond that it is permissible for the government to 
prioritize considerations of overall well-being over autonomy because government pol-
icy serves as the starting point for individuals to develop a determinate will about their 
particular options.  There is an importance difference between cases in which individu-
als have a determinate will about the matter, like Bob does, and cases in which indi-
viduals do not have a determinate will, such as Casey and the cafeteria patrons.  Bob 
has a determinate will about the matter of surgery, indicating a strong preference not to 
undergo the surgery.  In contrast, Sunstein and Thaler argue that individuals typically 
do not have a determinate will with respect to many of the choices given to them by the 
government, such as choices in matters like insurance plans or savings contribution 
rates.  Since the individuals lack a determinate will with regard to the options prior to 
receiving them, the government does not disrespect autonomy by prioritizing consid-
erations of well-being over autonomy.   
This objection, though, misses the importance of the government’s reasoning in 
making policy that concerns the self-regarding choices of individuals.  The distinguish-
ing feature that makes paternalism impermissible in regard to competent adults is the 
practical reasoning that drives the paternalist actor to substitute her own judgment for 
that of a competent adult in a sphere of decision-making over which that adult has au-
thority.  What is particularly worrisome is that Sunstein and Thaler’s reasoning makes 
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individual well-being the principal consideration over autonomy, reasoning manifested 
in their questionable support for the default method of nudging over the forced choice 
method.  In a recent response to the book Nudge, Daniel Hausman and Brynn Welch 
contend that Sunstein and Thaler are essentially advocating manipulation to achieve a 
certain result.  According to Hausman and Welch, those who defend autonomy typically 
think of it as not simply about the cost and number of options, but the "control an indi-
vidual has over their own evaluations and choices" (2010, p. 128).  Sunstein and 
Thaler's attempt to shape choices through the default method is essentially taking ad-
vantage of people's psychological flaws and seems to diminish individual control over 
evaluation and deliberation.  Their chief worry, which is akin to my own, is that though 
libertarian paternalism is not coercive, “there may be something more insidious about 
shaping choices than about open constraint” when the intent is to bypass individual 
control over evaluations and deliberation (2010, p. 130).  Sunstein and Thaler do not 
hide the fact that well-being is their chief concern, but what they miss is the problematic 
nature of subordinating the individual’s will to considerations of her well-being through 
the manipulation of individual cognitive biases.  The government fails to respect indi-
vidual autonomy when it attempts to bypass the individual’s will, whether the will is de-
terminate or not. 
 
 
4 SOFT PATERNALISM TO THE RESCUE? 
It is worth repeating that the concern of this thesis is not with libertarian pater-
nalism’s policies, but with Sunstein and Thaler’s defense of the policies.  Namely, they 
think that because libertarian paternalism is non-coercive, it is an acceptable treatment 
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of competent adults.  They think that by merely preserving freedom of choice, they re-
spect autonomy.  Yet, because Sunstein and Thaler prioritize considerations of well-
being over considerations of autonomy, their defense is unlikely to be persuasive to 
those who defend a conception of autonomy as authority.  Intuitively, in deliberations 
about an individual’s self-regarding actions, the individual’s capacity for rational delib-
eration should exclude other considerations, like the individual’s well-being.  Yet, even 
if the S/T defense of libertarian paternalism fails to satisfy those committed to a concep-
tion of authoritative autonomy, I think that Sunstein and Thaler’s policy recommenda-
tions might be still be defendable.8   In this section, I review a paper by J.D. Trout to 
consider a possible soft paternalist defense of libertarian paternalism, but suggest that 
ultimately the best defense of libertarian paternalism would involve challenging the no-
tion that autonomously made decisions should always trump concerns about an individ-
ual’s well-being.9 
4.1 COGNITIVE BIASES AS A VOLUNTARINESS-VITIATING FACTOR 
John Stuart Mill argues that there are generally no good reasons for government 
paternalism.  According to this position, the government, in general, is justified in in-
fringing on individual sovereignty only in order to prevent harm to others who not con-
sent to be harmed (Mill, 1978, p. 9; Feinberg, 1986, p. 3).  More recently, liberals build-
ing on the work of Joel Feinberg have argued that there is never a good reason for pa-
ternalistic legal infringement on personal autonomy even if such infringement is a 
                                                     
8 This is not to rule out that libertarian paternalist policies might be problematic for other rea-
sons. For instance, Mario J. Rizzo (2009) represents the concern that the policies of the sort that 
Sunstein and Thaler defend are especially open to expansion and will likely to result in an unac-
ceptable infringement on autonomy.     
9 Sunstein and Thaler hint at this line of reasoning, but their unsupported claim that the auton-
omy-trumps-consequential concerns is “fanatical” is unhelpful at best. 
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means to enhancing individual autonomy (Feinberg, 1986, p. 68).10  In Harm to Self, 
Feinberg describes government paternalism in criminal law as especially "offensive 
morally" because it "invades the realm of personal autonomy where each competent, 
responsible, adult human being should reign supreme” (Feinberg, 1986, p. 25).  Accord-
ing to Feinberg (1986), concerns about autonomy should take precedence over con-
cerns about wellbeing; valuing personal sovereignty means treating it as a moral trump 
that “takes precedence even over [an individual’s] own good” (Feinberg, 1986, p. 61).  
Autonomy should be protected and can only be limited when one infringes on the 
autonomy of another who does not consent to this infringement.     
Feinberg, however, proposes an important modification to the above "hard" anti-
paternalist position.  Following Mill, who allows for outside interference with an individ-
ual's choices or actions when the voluntariness of that individual's choice is compro-
mised in some way, Feinberg argues that the government can intervene in individual 
choices when an actor is making "dangerous choices that are not truly his own" (1986, 
p. 99).  Contrasting his position with a more stringent or 'hard' form of anti-paternalism, 
Feinberg labels his view as ‘weak’ or ‘soft’ paternalism, saying that, in respect to the 
criminal law, “the state has the right to prevent self-regarding harmful conduct ... when 
but only when that conduct is substantially nonvoluntary, or when temporary interven-
tion is necessary to establish whether it is voluntary or not” (Feinberg, 1986, 12).  
Feinberg contends that soft paternalism is not really paternalism at all because the in-
                                                     
10 It is essential to clarify that Feinberg's position on paternalism is limited to concerns about the 
justification of the criminal law (1984, 3-4).  While many people have applied his notion of soft 
paternalism beyond the criminal law, as I do in this thesis, Feinberg is clear that he only intends 
his notion of soft paternalism to pertain to understanding the criminal law's moral limits.  To ac-
knowledge the distinction between Feinberg's own view and the view that Feinberg's soft pater-
nalism can be used more broadly in discussions about paternalism beyond the criminal law, I will 
refer to the conception of soft paternalism used in this thesis as "Feinbergian."  Additionally, al-
though I quote Feinberg extensively to explain the basic components of the Feinbergian position, 
the reader should keep in mind that Feinberg only intends for these passages to apply to the 
criminal law.   
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fringement merely protects the individual as though from another individual.  Since the 
individual might not choose the harm were the individual to be free from “voluntariness-
vitiating factors,” Feinberg explains that when an individual’s voluntariness is compro-
mised, “there are grounds for suspecting that [the choice] does not come from his own 
will, and might be as alien to him as the choices of someone else” (Feinberg, 1986, 12).  
Thus, Feinberg argues that soft paternalism is actually more akin to anti-paternalism 
than to paternalism. 
Ideally, a voluntary act is rationally chosen with “calmness and deliberateness ... 
no distracting or unsettling emotions, no neurotic compulsion, no misunderstanding” 
(Feinberg, 1986, 104).  Yet, there are many factors that could compromise the rational-
ity of an action.  The voluntariness of an act is inversely related to the presence of ele-
ments that work to distort rationality.  Since the individual might not choose the harm 
were the individual free from “voluntariness-vitiating factors,” Feinberg explains that 
when an individual’s voluntariness is compromised, “there are grounds for suspecting 
that [the choice] does not come from his own will, and might be as alien to him as the 
choices of someone else” (Feinberg, 1986, 12). Feinberg contends that when the volun-
tariness of an act falls below the threshold of “voluntary enough,” the government is 
justified in intervening in order to save the individual from self-inflicted harm.  In the soft 
paternalism framework, when the voluntariness of an act is sufficiently compromised 
and the threatened self-harm is great enough, the government is justified in interfering 
in the individual’s self-regarding actions. 
Given evidence of cognitive biases, it would seem that many of our choices might 
not be products of our rational capacity but instead be “choices” that arise apart from 
our own will.  In light of the ubiquitous and entrenched nature of cognitive biases, J.D. 
Trout (2005) argues that we should question whether we should view typical adults as 
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possessing the capacity to be competent decision makers.  Rather than thinking that 
competent adults have a capacity to deliberate, decide, and direct their lives however 
they want, whether or not they choose to do so, Trout contends that we should instead 
think of humans as bias-ridden creatures who are not all that capable at rationally going 
about achieving our considered judgments or implicit long-term goals (2005, pp. 395-
408).  According to Trout, cognitive biases are “systematic and psychologically incorri-
gible” (2005 p. 421).  It is nearly impossible for individuals alone to overcome their cog-
nitive biases even if they want to.  Biases are much like a common affliction shared by 
all people as a natural condition and “arise independently of the will; they are a factor 
external to it” (2005, p. 416).  In light of how biases work, Trout argues that the 
“choices” people make while under the influence of biases should not be considered as 
intentionally chosen (2005, p. 416).  Following Trout's reasoning, if cognitive biases are 
outside the will and compromise an individual’s ability to make fully informed rational 
judgments, then on the Feinbergian soft paternalism account we might say that the 
government is justified in substituting its own judgment for that of individuals in order to 
protect them from self-inflicted harm they are not really voluntarily choosing.   
Sunstein and Thaler indicate a potential amenability of libertarian paternalism to 
a Feinbergian soft paternalism justification.  They contend at one point that with liber-
tarian paternalism the government is only helping individuals make the decisions they 
would otherwise make were they freed from their cognitive hindrances (2006, p. 234).  
However, there are several good reasons to think soft paternalism might not serve as 
an adequate foundation for libertarian paternalism.  First, the government action al-
lowed by soft paternalism is more restricted than what Sunstein and Thaler propose.  In 
soft paternalism, the government can intervene with self-regarding actions only to pro-
tect the individual from harm.  Even if it is shown that an individual’s deliberative ca-
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pacities are sufficiently compromised, for the Feinbergian account the risk to the indi-
vidual must be quite severe before the government is justified in intervening.  As 
Feinberg notes, “[p]ersons may act as nonvoluntarily as is imaginable and as frequently 
as possible, so far as the soft paternalist is concerned, provided no harm is caused 
thereby” (1986, p. 118).  The harm that Feinberg imagines here is an irrevocable harm 
to self like serious injury or death, not merely a failure to make the optimal choice (1986, 
p. 118-24).  In contrast, the policies of libertarian paternalism are aimed at making the 
lives of individuals better.  While Sunstein and Thaler consider some choices that might 
indirectly lead to harm were the individual to choose unwisely, like selecting a health 
insurance plan, it is unlikely that individuals who make the less optimal choice will risk 
anything like the level of harm that a Feinbergian imagines is necessary to justify gov-
ernment action in self-regarding choices.       
 One might then simply reject the Feinbergian view that the government can only 
act when an individual, through her sufficiently nonvoluntary choices, risks significant 
and irrevocable harm.  Instead, one might propose that it is permissible for the govern-
ment to intervene in self-regarding choices whenever the individual’s autonomy is com-
promised by cognitive biases.  However, if this were the only criterion, the government 
would have broad permission to intervene in individual self-regarding choices that de-
fenders of autonomy would resist.  Feinberg draws a useful distinction between irra-
tional choices and unreasonable choices.  While “rationally” refers to an individual’s 
capacity to deliberate and judge, “reasonableness” refers to how people value the 
worthwhileness of a choice (1986, p 106).  A person could possess the capacity to de-
liberate and judge and also make decisions that others find to be unreasonable.  
Feinberg, following Mill (1978) and Arneson (1980), insists that valuing a thick notion of 
autonomy entails giving individuals the space to make choices that others might find 
36 
unreasonable.  Yet, if the cognitive biases operate as stealthily as Trout proposes, it is 
not always clear when an individual is making a rational but unreasonable choice and 
when an individual is making an irrational and unreasonable choice that will result in 
unwanted self-harm.  Even interviewing an individual to discover the voluntariness of 
her choice would not likely clarify how much her choice is really a product of reflective 
deliberation or a product of a pernicious bias because biases influence how we view 
our own actions.  Since irrationality and unreasonableness blur together, if the pres-
ence of irrationality is the only criterion that justifies government action in the lives of 
individuals, a soft paternalistic approach to cognitive biases might very well allow for 
government interference in self-regarding actions that are unreasonable but not irra-
tional.  Allowing for this would chip away at the very notion of autonomy that libertarian 
paternalists would be trying to preserve by turning to soft paternalism to justify their 
policies. 
Another promising defense of libertarian paternalism might involve a challenge 
to the notion that autonomously made decisions should always trump concerns about 
an individual’s well-being.  Groll provides some direction in this matter, noting that it is 
unclear whether anti-paternalistic intuitions in the case of competent individuals are 
right.  He asks, “If someone is really going to make a poor choice with respect to his 
own well-being, why wouldn’t it be justified to paternalistically intervene just because 
he has the (here unexercised) capacity for sound judgment?” (2012, p. 719).  Groll con-
tends that responding to this question is a big task that would “involve giving an ac-
count of what is valuable about autonomy” (2012, p. 719).  While answering this ques-
tion is beyond the scope of this thesis, I think that there can be a middle course be-
tween treating the will as structurally decisive and treating it as substantially decisive.  
Defending a middle course would likely involve taking into account considerations 
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about the relationship between autonomy and well-being, as well as considerations 
about the relationship between the value of autonomy and the value of other goods, like 
fairness.  This course would need to defend a position concerning when the will is to be 
treated as structurally decisive and when other considerations, like well-being or the 
threat of harm, might have priority.11       
4.2 CONCLUSION  
I have shown why those who hold to a notion of autonomy as authority have good 
reason to reject the Sunstein and Thaler’s argument for libertarian paternalism.  
Though the S/T argument holds that libertarian paternalism respects autonomy be-
cause it is non-coercive, paternalism in the case of competent of adults does not have 
to involve coercion for it to be problematic.  What it is ultimately worrisome about Sun-
stein and Thaler’s defense is that they think that concerns of well-being have priority 
over concerns of autonomy.  In making well-being lexically prior to autonomy, Sunstein 
and Thaler do not give autonomy the respect it deserves, at least if the conception of 
autonomy as authority is accepted.  Weak-paternalism might offer one foundation for 
libertarian paternalism, though this approach has considerable problems that would 
need to be addressed.  It seems, then, that an adequate defense of libertarian paternal-
ism would require a direct attack on autonomy as authority, and such an attack is yet to 
be forthcoming from the defenders of libertarian paternalism. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
11 Russ Shafer-Landau (2005) and Richard Arneson (2005) both offer sketches of positions that 
might demonstrate how autonomy can be balanced with other concerns, like self-harm and well-
being. 
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